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In this descriptive historical review, I examine indicators of economic health for 
FBS athletic departments over time—attendance, media revenues, postseason 
revenues, operating revenues and expenses of athletic departments, and competi-
tive balance. In addition, I review these and business management responses by 
athletic directors during the first year of the current recession. While there is 
some limited evidence that the recession of 2001 impacted BCS bowl payouts 
and revenues of the largest athletic departments, these rebounded quickly. Essen-
tially, FBS athletic departments have been mostly impervious to business cycles. 
Implications are discussed.
“I don’t care how big and how wealthy they are, this is going to impact every-
body… The ones who will get hit hardest are the lower tier of I-A, with their 
champagne appetites and beer budgets.” —Mike Cleary, Director, National 
Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics (Brady, 2009).
There is tremendous interest in the responses made by college athletic depart-
ment directors to the current recession that started in 2008. Coupled with belief 
in some sort of “arms race” logic governing college sports spending (e.g., Frank, 
2004), sustainability becomes a natural question. As the recession appears to lose 
its punch, and we all wait for the data to be generated on its actual impacts on 
college sports, the point of this paper is to step back and take a historical look at 
sustainability in the face of previous economic business cycles. Perhaps this look 
back will prove informative on the current recession episode.
In this descriptive historical review, I examine indicators of economic health 
for FBS athletic departments over time. This is required since there is nothing 
comparable to an asset sale price, or change in stock market prices, associated 
with the production of college sports outputs. The indicators I choose are atten-
dance, media revenues, postseason revenues, operating revenues and expenses of 
athletic departments, and competitive balance. Especially interesting regarding 
the current interest in recessionary responses is the behavior of these indicators 
for 2008. In addition, I review business management responses during the first 
year of the recession.
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Business Cycles and the Economic Health 
of FBS Departments
As a point of reference, we have the National Bureau of Economic Research list of 
official recessions shown in Table 1. Especially pertinent, given the typically limited 
time frame for the economic and business data on college sports available to outside 
observers, are recessions after 1970 (the final 5 entries in Table 1). The original 
OPEC oil embargo eventually quadrupled the price of oil, bringing the economy to 
a skidding halt from 1973 to 75. The recessions of 1980–82, spurred by the Iranian 
revolution, also raised oil prices with impacts on the economy. The savings and loan 
crisis of 1990–91 was one of the long-term effects of Black Monday, in October of 
1987, a stock market collapse that reduced the Dow Jones Industrial Average by 
22.6%. The bursting of the dot.com bubble brought the economy back to earth for 
8 months, March to November 2001. Starting in December 2007, the collapse in 
credit availability in general, but especially in housing, and the downward spiral 
in housing sales feeding on itself, has been labeled the “mortgage crisis.” These 
events have wreaked the greatest havoc on the economy since the Great Depression.
In what follows, I examine attendance, media revenues, postseason revenues, 
operating revenues and expenses of athletic departments, and competitive balance 
Table 1 NBER Official Recessions.
Date Duration (Mos.)
Sept. 1902-Aug. 1904 23
May 1907-June 1908 13
Jan. 1910-Jan. 1912 24
Jan. 1913-Dec. 1914 23
Aug. 1918-March 1919 7
Jan. 1920-July 1921 18
May 1923-July 1924 14
Oct. 1926-Nov. 1927 13
Aug. 1929-March 1933 43
May 1937-June 1938 13
Feb. 1945-Oct. 1945 8
Nov. 1948-Oct. 1949 11
July 1953-May 1954 10
Aug. 1957-April 1958 8
April 1960-Feb. 1961 10
Dec. 1969-Nov. 1970 11
Nov. 1973-March 1975 16
Jan. 1980-July 1980 6
July 1981-Nov. 1982 16
July 1990-March 1991 8
March 2001-Nov. 2001 8
Source: Excerpted from NBER, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html.
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as indicators of long term sustainability. For the current recession, from the col-
lege sports perspective, one would examine impacts beginning late in 2008. But I 
reserve that for the next section of the paper.
Attendance
Figure 1 shows total football attendance across all divisions for 1951–1983. Zimbal-
ist (1999, pp. 93–96) documents that the initial dip here is due to the first college 
football TV experiments but, eventually, TV and attendance are clearly comple-
mentary. In any event, since attendance rises continuously throughout (after 1953), 
it is difficult to point to any detectable impact that could have been caused by any 
of the recessions listed in Table 1. While we can never know how high attendance 
might have been in the absence of any recession impacts, there is nothing in Figure 
1 suggesting any impact at all.
Attendance data for the FBS (and FCS, just because it was easily available), 
1997–2008, are depicted in Figure 2. While not so in the FCS (attendance is pretty 
much a given at 4.5 million to 5 million), there was a short lull in attendance for 
the FBS in 2004 and 2005. From Table 1, this lull does not correspond with any 
slow-down in the economy (and precedes the current recession).
Annual attendance growth rates by conference are in Table 2. In the FBS, the 
newest conference (Sun Belt) and two successfully realigned conferences (ACC 
and C-USA) are the attendance growth rate stars. The rest of the conferences grew 
at about the same rate as the economy at large (typically, 2.5–3% annually). Of 
course, as the number of independents has shrunk, so did their attendance growth 
but this is probably a good sign for college sports—conferences were more attractive 
over time. The WAC suffered the worst annual decline, but it also was the confer-
Figure 1 — Total D-I Football Attendance, 1951–1983. Source: Created from attendance 
data in Zimbalist (1999, Table 5.1, p. 95).
6Figure 2 — FBS (D-IA) and FCS (D-IAA) Attendance, 1997–2008. Source: Created from 
attendance data at ncaa.org.
Table 2 Attendance Growth Rates by Conference, FBS (D-IA)  
and FCS (D-IAA), 1997–2008.
Division I-A Growth Division I-AA Growth
Atlantic Coast 5.9% Big Sky 2.3%
Big 12 3.5% Big South 17.3%
Big East 2.8% Great West 5.5%
Big Ten 1.2% Independents –21.5%
Conference USA 8.3% Ivy 2.2%
Independents –1.2% Mid-Eastern 0.9%
Mid-American 0.7% Northeast 9.1%
Mountain West 2.1% Ohio Valley 3.0%
Pacific-10 2.3% Patriot 1.4%
Southeastern 2.2% Pioneer 5.0%
Sun Belt 7.6% Southern 2.9%
Western Athletic –6.3% Southland –0.7%
Total 2.6% Southwestern 2.1%
Total 1.6%
Total Both Divisions 2.5%
Source: Calculated from attendance data at ncaa.org.
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ence in the greatest upheaval through reorganization and that didn’t happen due to 
any downturn in the economy. In the FCS, the Big South, Northeast, and Pioneer 
clearly stand out in terms of growth rates in attendance. Independents bore nearly 
the entire brunt of the offset.
So, how does attendance shape up during the four most recent recession epi-
sodes? From a strictly analytical standpoint, this is a trick question. Just looking 
at Figures 1 and 2, and Table 2, attendance appears to have been barely touched at 
all. But we don’t get to know how attendance would have behaved in the absence 
of recessions. In addition, for every attendance outcome, in addition to general 
economic conditions, there are particular pricing choices by athletic directors 
behind the attendance results. The data task for demand estimation, to determine 
pricing impacts on attendance, is beyond the more modest goals of this paper. So, 
for now, recognizing that care must be exercised in drawing any conclusions only 
from attendance data, it is difficult to see any sustainability issues in attendance.
Media Revenues
Football game rights fees are in Table 3 (Zimbalist, 1999, p. 95, reports similar data 
to 1983). Presumably, these are all for FBS games broadcast only on national TV. 
It’s best to sort out Table 3 after NCAA v. Board of Regents, 1984, the famous case 
divesting the NCAA of its governance of college football TV. Clearly, after 1984, 
Table 3 College Football Game Rights Fees 
($2009 millions).
Year # Games Total Contract Per Game
1952 12 $7.97 $0.66
1978 23 $102.58 $4.46
1979 23 $83.59 $3.63
1980 24 $80.30 $3.35
1981 24 $76.70 $3.20
1982 28 $129.08 $4.61
1983 28 $136.50 $4.88
1984 36 $44.72 $1.24
1985 42 $53.04 $1.26
1986 42 $56.05 $1.33
1987 42 $52.08 $1.24
1988 43 $50.27 $1.17
1989 43 $48.01 $1.12
1990 43 $45.13 $1.05
1991 71 $90.16 $1.27
1992 71 $90.10 $1.27
1993 71 $88.94 $1.25
1994 71 $86.59 $1.22
1995 71 $86.41 $1.22
Source: Fort (2006), Table 13.10.
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the annual rate of growth in rights fees is quite phenomenal. Adjusted for inflation, 
and recognizing that more games were broadcast, the rate of real annual growth 
in the total contract value between 1985 and 1995 was about 6.2%. And this all 
happened while the value per game remained pretty much constant in real terms.
More detail on recent conference contract values are shown in Table 4. Data are 
not uniformly reported at any source, so Table 4 is a bit incomplete, but these are 
not the kind of values one would expect from an industry hard hit by the recession 
of 2001. Zimbalist (1999, p. 103) states previous football deals (1990–1996) as: 
ACC ($70 million), Big East ($65 million), Big Ten/Pac-10 ($115 million), SEC 
($85 million), and Notre Dame ($45 million). Even allowing for a bit of variation 
in contract lengths between the earlier contracts and the ones reported in Table 4, 
the recent contract values swamp these earlier values.
Post-Season Revenues
Figure 3 shows the behavior of average postseason bowl payouts (collected from vari-
ous popular sources). The non-BCS bowls pretty much held their own to 2001–02. 
Table 4 Annual Conference Rights Fees in College Sports ($2009).
Conference Network Duration Ends Amount
Football
ACC ABC/ESPN 7 2010 $258 million
Big 12 FSN 12 2011 $214 million
Big East ABC/ESPN 7 2013–14 $200 million
Notre Dame CBS 5 2010 $45 million
Pac-10 ABC/ESPN 10 2006 $169 million
FSN 10 2006 $153 million
Basketball
ACC Raycom 10 2010–11 $300 million
Big East CBS 4 2012–13 Not available
Pac-10 FSN 9 2005–06 $52.5 million
Combined Contracts
Big 12 ABC/ESPN 7 2015–16 $500 million
Big East ABC/ESPN 2013–14 $200 million
Big Ten ABC/ESPN 10 2018 $1 billion
Big Ten Network 20 2028 $2.8 billion
C-USA ESPN 8 2008–09 $80 million
MAC ESPN 5 2007–08 $3 million
Mountain West CSTV 7 2012–13 $82 million
SEC ESPN 15 2024 $2.2 billion
CBS 15 2024 $800 million
Sun Belt ESPN n/a 2007–08 Not available
WAC ESPN 6 2008–09 $8 million
Source: Next edition of Fort (2006). See, for example, Table 13.5.
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The decline in the average payout after that is about 12% per year. However, total 
spending on these bowls increased. Since the decline is after 2001, and there are 
no sharp changes after that, the declining average payout is most likely due to an 
increase in the number of non-BCS bowl games from 26 to 33. Growth in total 
spending, as well as the number of non-BCS bowl games, is another indicator of 
sustained sponsorship interest.
Turning to the BCS bowls, there were some structural changes over the years 
in Figure 3. The institution of the BCS occurred in 1998–99, although the prede-
cessor Bowl Alliance occurred a few years earlier. The BCS Championship Game 
was added in 2005–2006 along with new BCS rules. Payouts were set differently 
for non-BCS conferences (C-USA, MAC, Mountain West, Sun Belt, and WAC) 
and Notre Dame, and smaller payments were set for a second team from the same 
conference that appears in a BCS bowl.
The first big jump in payouts, 1995–96, probably corresponds to the creation of 
the original Bowl Alliance. BCS bowls all converged to about $12 million—Fiesta, 
$4.4 million to $12.3 million; Orange, $6.2 million to $11.9 million; Rose, $9.6 
million to $11.7 million; and Sugar, $6.5 million to $11.9 million. The second big 
jump corresponds to the creation of the BCS (1998–99) where payouts were equal-
ized to $16.75 million. Payouts suffered their first dip in real terms in 2001–02. Note 
that this did coincide with the 2001 recession. However, payouts returned to their 
earlier level in two years. They dived again in 2004–05 but this time without any 
corresponding recession. Average BCS payouts rebounded for a year for 2005–06 
with the addition of the BCS Championship and then fell back to 1995–96 levels 
from 2006 to 07 on.
Figure 3 — Average BCS and non-BCS Payouts ($2009). Source: Created from data 
gleaned by the author from popular sources.
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Figure 4 — Ten Highest and Ten Lowest Conference Growth Rates, in NCAA Distributions, 
2003–04–2007–08. Source: Reports on NCAA Distributions at ncaa.org.
This severe drop in 2006–07 is difficult to interpret. There is no corresponding 
recession for the severe drop in 2006–2007 like there was for 2001–02. The drop 
appears to be due, instead, to the interesting rules on reduced payouts. The Fiesta 
Bowl had a second BCS team all three years, the Rose two of the three, the Sugar 
split with non-BCS conferences two of three years, and Notre Dame the other. 
Only the Orange Bowl and BCS Championship did not have this type of statutory 
lower payout to any of their teams.
Total payouts for BCS games over this last period went from $83.2 million in 
2005–06, to $73.4 million in 2006–07, to $66.8 million in 2007–08, to $71.8 million 
in 2008–09. Along with new sharing rules and the addition of the BCS Champion-
ship game, we see lower total payouts and lower average payouts. This remains 
a puzzle for now but does coincide with the increase in non-BCS games; perhaps 
there is some competition in action here reducing sponsorship prices in the BCS.
Mondello (2008) reports that over the period 2002–03–2005–06, BCS distribu-
tions to all conferences grew from $114.7 million to $125.9 million, while non-BCS 
payouts held in the $63 million to $67 million range over the same period. Net bowl 
revenues back to conferences have been right around $128 million with nearly no 
change. On the tails of the last recession of 2001, this seems further evidence of 
economic sustainability. To further reinforce this observation, the BCS recently 
negotiated a $500 million TV deal with ESPN that perpetuates the current system 
through 2014.
Things are certainly just as sparkly for basketball. Figure 4 shows the “Top 
10” and “Bottom 10” real annual rates of growth of NCAA conference distribu-
tions from 2003 to 04–2007–08. The source of these distributions is primarily 
March Madness tournament revenue at the gate and from TV rights fees. For the 
top 10 recipients, the real rate of annual growth is quite impressive. All are above 
5% and the West Coast Conference has been a true star. Even at the bottom of the 
An Economic Look at Sustainability    11
heap, only four of the ten suffered any reduction. Zimbalist (1999, p. 115) reported 
a total across all of the NCAA’s named distribution funds (basketball, academic 
enhancement, conference grants, special assistance, sport-sponsorship, grants-in-
aid, and supplemental) of $145 million in 1997. This compares to an increase of 
$310.2 million to $372.6 million over the 2003–04–2007–08 period in the most 
recent ncaa.org data.
There is only one piece of evidence here that recessions hit any of these revenue 
streams in any way, the sharp decline in the average BCS payout in 2001–02 and its 
subsequent rebound. For the most part, increases, as generally observed in non-BCS 
bowl payouts, BCS conference distributions, and NCAA distributions, are incon-
sistent with dramatic recession impacts. Further, the declines in 2004–05 and again 
in 2007–08 don’t correspond to any recession. One last observation for the decline 
in the average BCS payout in 2008–09 is reserved for the next section of the paper.
Revenues and Expenses at FBS Athletic Departments
The NCAA commissions an occasional, ongoing survey of operating revenues and 
expenses for athletic departments in the different divisions of college sports (most 
recently, Fulks, 2009, released just after the current version of this paper). Simply 
combining the revenue and expense data from the FBS into Figure 5 presents an 
aggregate picture of the sustainability of big-time college sports that is unmistak-
able. The data are presented in two forms in the original documents, the average 
(sometimes, median) report and the largest report. So, in any given year, neither of 
these reported aggregates match up to the same department; the average revenue 
reported does not necessarily come from the same athletic department that reports 
the average expenditure, for example. But apparently the NCAA finds this type of 
characterization of “average” and “large” programs useful so I carry it along here.
Figure 5 — Operating Revenues and Expenses ($2009). Source: From the NCAA Revenues 
and Expenses data, most recently Fulks (2009).
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In real terms, the annual growth rate in the average report of both revenues 
and expenses is 4.9%, nearly twice the typical growth rate in the economy at large. 
Further, the correlation at the average reports of revenues and expenses is 0.996. 
Essentially, “average” athletic departments enjoy tremendous growth and spend 
every dollar they bring in. For the largest reported values, the real annual growth 
rate in revenues is a truly astonishing 9.9%; expenses also increase dramatically at 
an inflation-adjusted 5.8%. The correlation between the two is 0.933. Unlike their 
“average” counterparts, the “largest” athletic departments don’t spend everything 
they bring in. But quick reference to Figure 5 shows that this is a relatively recent 
phenomenon occurring after 1999. While the increase in revenues slowed a bit 
in 2001 (a recession year!), and athletic directors at the “largest” departments 
cut their spending dramatically, it was short-lived. Spending rebounds to meet 
revenues by 2006.
So we now have another bit of evidence of a recessionary impact for 2001 to 
go along with the brief dip in average BCS payouts. However, while the data for 
the “largest” departments are a bit sketchy, none of the recession episodes in Table 
1 appear to have done much to the “average” department. Revenues and expendi-
tures really didn’t take off until after 1980, but they did not fall before that (during 
the recessions of the 1970s). Further, growth for both the “average” and “largest” 
departments was steady through the 1980s and truly stupendous on through the 
1990s for the “largest” departments.
Competitive Balance
Any sort of growing competitive balance problem over time could prove detrimental 
to the sustainability of college sports. Rottenberg (1956) was the first economist 
to warn of these dangers—if fans of the perennial also-rans lose interest in their 
home team, and then lose interest in a sports offering in general, even the remaining 
teams will suffer reduced support during the determination of champions. Fans are 
concerned with many aspects of balance but for my purpose a well-known tracking 
device and a direct look at championships in a couple of major FBS conferences 
suffice. The “ratio of standard deviations” (or RSD, for short) compares the actual 
standard deviation of final conference winning percent to the winning percent that 
would exist if the probability any team could win any game is 0.5. If RSD equals 
1, then actual standard deviation in a conference is the same as for this character-
ization of a balanced conference; the farther from 1 the less balanced. RSD also 
has the virtue of allowing comparisons over time even though both the number of 
teams and schedule lengths change.
RSD values for the Big Ten and Pac-10 Conferences are reported in Table 5, 
1970–2008. Clearly, winning percent imbalance is the rule. Over the last 38 years, 
the decade average RSD in both conferences is always greater than 1.5 (except 
for the Pac-10 in the 1980s, but still close to 1.5). Occasionally, RSD exceeds 2.0 
(e.g., Big Ten, 1996–1998). Winning percent imbalance is also always greater in 
the Big Ten than in the Pac-10 (by between 12% and 18%), except for the most 
recent decade where the difference has closed essentially to zero. Depken and 
Wilson (2004) use more sophisticated techniques and all data back to the 1800s 
for some teams and conclude that there has been a negative trend in balance over 
time, uninterrupted by exogenous factors like recessions.
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Championship outcomes, also listed in Table 5, also are quite imbalanced. For 
example, before 1993, Penn State’s first season of play, equal sharing of the cham-
pionship would have each Big Ten team winning every 10 years. But Michigan won 
or shared the title 15 times in 23 years. That’s a championship every 1.5 years! Ohio 
State wasn’t far behind with a championship every 2.1 years. From 1993-on in the 
Big Ten equal access to the championship would see each team winning every 11 
years. Instead, Ohio State won the championship every 2.0 years Michigan every 
3.2 years. Things were only a bit more balanced in the Pac-10. After 1978, when 
Arizona and Arizona State joined the conference, equal access would again have 
a championship every 10 years. USC won or shared the championship in 15 of the 
29 times from 1978 on, or every 1.9 years.
Nothing about the data in Table 5 seems to relate to recessions for either confer-
ence. More balance did occur in Big Ten championships after Penn State entered 
but this was after the 1990–91 recession and well before the 2001 recession. A nice 
future research agenda is to actually track revenue imbalance and the impacts on 
balance in college sports of alterations in revenue sharing.
The Current Economic Malaise
As mentioned for the current recession, one would look to Fall, 2008 and on to 
determine impacts. But we only really have a little data and some casual observa-
tions for 2008 and nothing after that. In this section, I examine what I can from 
the data sets above, plus business management responses during the first year of 
the recession.
Unfortunately, the most recent revenues and expenses data were published just 
as this paper went to press and could not be incorporated into the analysis. This is 
unfortunate since one of our two pieces of evidence of recession impacts concerns 
the 2001 episode for the “largest” departments. Since the types of people impacted 
by the current recession are primarily taking a hit in their portfolios, and those 
are the types that support college football, it would be interesting to see if similar 
impacts to the 2001 episode have occurred for the present recession.
Attendance
The FBS attendance data can also be used to create Figure 6, useful for distinguish-
ing impacts of the current economic malaise compared with the past decade. For 
FBS football in 2008, only the WAC and Independents had lower attendance in 
the first year of the recession than they enjoyed on average for the entire decade 
prior. And on a per game basis, only C-USA, the Mountain West, and WAC suf-
fered slightly. Indeed, 2008 broke all-time records for conferences and the FBS 
and FCS overall (Johnson, 2009).
The SEC totaled 6,378,085 fans while averaging a record 76,844 per game. 
That average mark topped the SEC’s all-time conference record of 75,706 from 
2006. The Big Ten (70,125), Big 12 (62,956), Pac-10 (57,350) and Atlantic Coast 
(52,737) rounded out the top five for conference attendance. The Big 12 and Sun 
Belt set conference bests in total attendance. The SEC, Big 12, and Sun Belt also 
topped their previous high for fans per game.
14
Table 5 Ratio of Standard Deviations and Conference Champs, 
Pac-10 and Big Ten, 1970–2008.
Year
Pac-10 Big Ten
RSD Champs RSD Champs
1970 1.37 Stanford 1.94 OSU
1971 1.13 Stanford 1.61 Michigan
1972 1.46 SC 1.64 Michigan/OSU
1973 1.81 SC 1.96 Michigan/OSU
1974 1.67 SC 1.72 Michigan/OSU
1975 1.74 Cal/UCLA 1.53 OSU
1976 1.71 SC 1.37 Michigan/OSU
1977 1.62 Washington 1.62 Michigan/OSU
1978 1.44 SC 1.86 Michigan/MSU
1979 1.35 SC 1.85 OSU
1970s Ave. 1.53 1.71
1980 1.41 Wash. 1.89 Michigan
1981 1.63 Wash. 1.44 Iowa/OSU
1982 1.45 UCLA 1.81 Michigan
1983 1.28 UCLA 1.98 Illinois
1984 1.66 SC 1.44 OSU
1985 1.20 UCLA 1.63 Iowa
1986 1.37 ASU 1.46 Michigan/OSU
1987 1.58 SC/UCLA 1.55 MSU
1988 1.50 SC 1.72 Michigan
1989 1.20 SC 2.00 Michigan
1980s Ave. 1.43 1.69
1990 1.30 Wash. 1.83 Illinois/Iowa/MSU/Mich.
1991 1.80 Wash. 1.66 Michigan
1992 1.31 Stanf./Wash. 1.13 Michigan
1993 1.34 Arizona/SC/UCLA 1.92 OSU/Wisconsin
1994 1.49 Oregon 1.60 PSU
1995 1.70 SC/Wash. 1.94 NWU
1996 1.67 ASU 2.03 NWU/OSU
1997 1.86 UCLA/WSU 2.10 Michigan
1998 2.02 UCLA 2.10 Mich./OSU/Wisconsin
1999 1.54 Stanf./Wash. 1.78 Wisconsin
1990s Ave. 1.60 1.81
2000 1.71 Ore./OSU/Wash. 1.34 Michigan/NWU/Purdue
2001 1.90 Ore. 1.22 Illinois
2002 1.48 SC/WSU 2.00 Iowa/OSU
2003 1.31 SC 1.84 Michigan
2004 1.90 SC 1.70 Iowa/Michigan
2005 1.70 SC 1.61 OSU/PS
2006 1.23 Cal/SC 1.79 OSU
2007 1.19 ASU/SC 1.38 OSU
2008 1.76 SC 1.48 OSU/PSU
2000s Ave. 1.57 1.60
Source: Updated from Fort (2006, Table 13.2).
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But there is some evidence that things may be going differently for basketball. 
Wieberg (2009) reports that the 12 highest attendance leaders in Division I bas-
ketball all suffered attendance declines. This current paper is a bit football-centric 
and a parallel assessment of basketball is certainly in order, as well as a broader 
analysis of all divisions of college sports.
Media Revenues
Back to Table 4, recently we see all-time records for the combined (football and 
basketball) media revenues for the SEC and the Big Ten. In addition, the Big East 
is up $95 million for football and the Mountain West is up $34 million in basketball 
over past contract amounts. At least as far as these data suggest, the current reces-
sion is not slowing media revenues.
Post Season Revenues
Back to Figure 3, 2008–09 postseason revenues are down about 7%, from $12.1 
million to $11.2 million, but not tragically so given recent history. And we need 
to remember that the BCS negotiated a $500 million TV deal with ESPN that 
perpetuates the current system through 2014. None the less, given the evidence of 
a turndown in the average BCS bowl payout associated with the 2001 recession, a 
close watch on subsequent payout data are certainly in order.
Competitive Balance
Back to the Table 5, balance would be expected to be susceptible to alterations in 
the distribution of revenues. If differences in revenues across college sports market 
areas were reduced by a recession, or if any unexpected media revenue declines 
hit larger athletic departments harder, balance could improve. The decade average 
Figure 6 — 2008 and Decade Average Attendance by FBS Conference. Source: Created 
from the attendance data at ncaa.org
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for the 2000s does suggest some improved balance in both the Big Ten and the 
Pac-10 (much more so in the Big Ten). But in both of these conferences, RSD took 
a decided jump, indicating decreased balance in 2008—7% in the Big Ten and 48% 
in the Pac-10. For the reasons given by Rottenberg, this most recent result bears 
scrutiny. But, again, only one year of data does not a story make!
Business Management
While not explicitly my forte, the answer to whether the current recession is having 
significant impacts may lie in simply observing the business management responses 
of athletic directors. Michael Cross, Athletic Director at Bradley University, has 
an extensive collection of these responses offered at his UltimateSportsInsider.
com. I have combed through them and entries for FBS athletic departments appear 
in the Appendix. Only actual actions by athletic directors are included, omitting 
institution-wide approaches to declines in revenues as well as entries framed by 
“considering this” or “planning that.” Appendix entries include actions taken at 64 
different FBS departments.
Except in a very few instances, the entries in the Appendix represent precisely 
the type of trimming at the margin one would expect when the impacts are not 
large—limiting staff travel; busing close travel rather than flying; cutting spend-
ing on marching bands, dance teams, and cheerleaders; eliminating printed media 
guides, reduced professional travel, equipment reductions in sports besides football 
and basketball. There is a smattering of furloughs and voluntary pay reductions by 
ADs and coaches but none have lost their jobs. Staff and other support positions are 
the major losses. The only sports cut at an FBS school that I found was the men’s 
and women’s swimming teams at the University of Washington.
Instead, there is a renewed vigor with experiments on the revenue side—some 
ticket price increases, sponsorship pursuits, and increasing student fee payments 
to athletics. Boise State has actually begun selling stock in Boise State Athletics, 
Inc. (what I will call “vanity” stock since it can neither grow in value nor provide 
holders with any vote over athletic department operations). There also are bright 
spots where a very few athletic departments are aiding the academic side by a mil-
lion dollars or so. It was also recently announced that Texas coach Mack Brown’s 
existing contract, with years remaining, will be replaced by one that pays him 
around $5 million annually. The rest of the top-pay coaches down to around $3 
million should follow suit shortly as attendance to date has remained strong and 
interest in postseason play as well.
Conclusions
I examine historically indicators of the economic health of FBS athletic depart-
ments—attendance, media revenues, postseason revenues, operating revenues and 
expenses at FBS athletic departments, and competitive balance. Especially inter-
esting regarding the current interest in recessionary responses, is a look at what 
data there are on these same variables specifically in 2008. I also survey business 
management responses during the first year of the recession.
There is limited evidence of recessionary impacts on FBS athletic departments. 
Average BCS payouts did fall, as did operating revenues to the “largest” depart-
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ments, corresponding to the recession of 2001. However, the rebound was quick. 
All-in-all, at least in terms of the slings and arrows of economic cycles, little seems 
to threaten the sustainability of FBS athletic departments. The data on the impact of 
past recessions, and what little data there are on the impacts of the current malaise, 
suggest that attendance, media contract levels, operating revenues, and postseason 
revenues all seem pretty much impervious to downturns in the economy at large. 
In addition, while both regular season play and championship outcomes are quite 
imbalanced (at least in the Big Ten and Pac-10), at least during the current decade, 
balance hasn’t worsened. However, 2008 did show evidence of decreased balance 
in both of these conferences.
Perhaps none of this is surprising since those impacted by the current reces-
sion are primarily taking a hit in their portfolios, rather than their annual incomes. 
But if the recovery that appears to be on the horizon takes a long time to occur, 
so that these same people must begin to dip into their declining portfolios for 
annual consumption, things could worsen for FBS departments. We have already 
seen this in sponsorship in other areas, especially in Michigan, my current state 
of residence.
Every analysis should recognize its limitations. Here, I think the main caution is 
that the analysis is football-centric and extends beyond the FBS only for attendance. 
There are other sports and other divisions awaiting thorough analysis as well. And 
it is intuitive that athletic departments in other divisions may be more vulnerable 
to economic cycles. Anecdotally, FCS Hofstra University just announced the end 
of its football program and that the institutional financial support it enjoyed previ-
ously would be redirected to the academic side of the university.
Finally, there may be other reasons to fear for the sustainability of college sports 
besides economic ones. And these other types of tensions may actually be fueled 
by the apparent economic resilience of athletic departments during recessions. 
Other parts of the university may suffer differentially during economic turndowns. 
Observing that athletic departments emerge relatively unscathed may add to the 
other philosophical and political criticisms of big-time college sports.
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Appendix:
Management Responses by FBS Athletic Directors
School Approach
Arkansas Committing $1 million to the University’s general fund.
Army Limiting travel squads and professional travel.
Arizona St. Football Coach and Men’s Basketball Coach taking a 12 day furlough.
Auburn Scheduling contests closer to home, using bus travel for contests that 
are five hours or less from campus, and limiting professional travel.
BC Won’t pay for the band to travel to any away games this year.
Boise State Increasing football season ticket prices (17% on average), signing 
a corporate sponsorship deal with Learfield Sports. Offering a three 
month payment plan option (for a $15 fee) for renewing season ticket 
holders. Laying off three staff members, the football program elimi-
nated two interns, land line phones have been eliminated for the gym-
nastics program, and printed media guides have been eliminated with 
some exceptions for football and basketball. Selling shares in Boise 
State Athletics Inc., allows shareholders to vote for board members. 
Shares are $100 each and 1,200 have already been sold.
Cal Bus to USC and UCLA. Institute state mandated furlough days for the 
coaching staff. Eliminating eight staff positions, cutting international 
team travel.
Cincinnati Stop providing scholarship support to three men’s teams—track and 
field, cross country and swimming—beginning next year, phased in 
over four years.
Colorado S. Reduction in staffing and loss of summer school scholarship support. 
Increasing student athletic fee.
Florida Freezing football ticket prices for 2009. Band will reduce the number 
of away football games they attend. The University Athletic Associa-
tion is going to send $6 million dollars to the University’s general 
fund.
Florida Intl. The cuts will include significant layoffs. New Men’s Basketball Coach 
Isiah Thomas will work for free. Eliminating marching band. Elimi-
nated cheer leading team.
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Florida State Reductions in tutoring, shifting from charter flights to charter buses, 
and cancellation of league swimming meets. Using pay cuts, furloughs 
and unpaid vacations to close the budget gap. Band will reduce the 
number of away football games they attend.
Fresno State Eliminating printed media guides. Eliminating hotel stays before home 
football games and will no longer fly to games at the University of 
Nevada
Georgia Athletic department to donate $6 million to the University’s general fund.
GA Tech Laying off 13 individuals and leaving two vacant positions unfilled.
Hawaii AD takes voluntary 7% pay cut. Expected coaches will be asked to do 
the same.
Idaho Positions left vacant, elimination of assistant track coach, elimina-
tion of team banquets, travel reductions and scaled down recruiting. 
Reduced their support staff by leaving open vacant positions. In addi-
tion, all one way travel less than 400 miles will be via bus.
Iowa Holding football season ticket prices steady for 2009. Single game and 
premium game ticket prices will increase. Slowing the construction 
timetable and process on $50 million worth of improvements at Kin-
nick Stadium and Carver-Hawkeye Arena. Reduced travel costs.
Iowa State Eliminating a trip for the men’s basketball team to Germany, eliminat-
ing a chartered flight to Missouri for football and eliminating the foot-
ball media guide.
LA-Monroe Scheduled three guarantee football games for the 2009 season (Texas, 
Arizona State and Kentucky) will bring in approximately $2.5 million 
in revenue. Eliminating print media guides and also using bus travel for 
any trips that are less than 500 miles.
Louisville Instituted a hiring freeze while capping expenditures.
LA Tech Reducing out of region travel.
LSU No raises. Renegotiating football guarantee games.
Maryland Restricted all coaches’ spending to team travel and recruiting, refrained 
from hiring replacements for almost a dozen administrative staffers 
who left for other jobs and cut basic amenities such as water service to 
its Comcast Center offices. Eliminated funding for the marching band.
Miami (FL) Chartered flights will be abandoned in favor of buses for games at 
South Florida (a less than 5 hr trip) and Central Florida (less than 4 hr) 
in 2009. Requirement to book air travel 21 days in advance to obtain 
the best prices available. Laid off staff back in January. Scheduling 
nonconference games in men’s basketball against in-state opponents to 
reduce travel expenses, and equipment reductions for baseball.
Michigan Decreasing the price of season tickets in football. Limit out of confer-
ence travel. Used bus travel instead of charter air for men’s basketball 
to play at Northwestern. Elimination of printed media guides. Michigan 
reported a budget surplus of between $9 and $10 million to the Michi-
gan Board of Regents.
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Michigan St. Football traveled to Ohio State and Indiana by bus instead of charter 
air. Reducing administrator travel with teams. Elimination of radio cov-
erage of away volleyball games.
Minnesota Not to extend any coaching contracts (including the head football 
coach) or to provide any pay increases to staff.
Miss. St. Increasing student ticket prices for football.
Missouri Shifting air travel from charters to commercial air, reducing out of 
season competition, sleeping three student athletes to a hotel room 
instead of two, hiring freeze for nonessential personnel, reducing tele-
vision advertising, reducing overtime.
NC State Traveled by bus to a basketball game at Virginia Tech rather than using 
charter aircraft. Coaches are sharing rooms when traveling and are only 
permitted to attend one convention per year.
Nevada 6% pay cut. Ski team will need to have all of its operational costs 
funded by donors. Added a $5 surcharge to all of their season ticket 
packages and $1 surcharge to all individual game tickets in football and 
men’s basketball to support the band.
NMSU Eliminate 8 staff positions. Asking boosters to provide after-practice 
and late night snacks.
Northwestern Increasing student athletic fee by $4 to $37.
Ohio State Reducing meal money allocations, coaches are now sharing rooms on 
road trips, and the elimination of overtime pay. Elimination of printed 
media guides. Coach and staff per diem reductions from $65 to $45 
and the men’s basketball team staying home from a planned trip to 
Italy.
Oklahoma Increase its payment to the academic side to $7 million for the coming 
year.
Purdue Increasing the cost of men’s basketball tickets by approximately $2. 
Elimination of media guides.
Rice Eliminated media guides
Rutgers Increasing the cost of football tickets by $10.
San Jose St. Moved scheduled Stanford game to 2014, replaced with a road game 
at Alabama that will pay $1 million, nearly five times more than the 
guarantee Stanford was paying. Bus to USC and UCLA. Institute state 
mandated furlough days for the coaching staff.
SMU Eliminated 10 positions including their Associate AD for Sales and 
Marketing and their Senior Women’s Administrator.
S. Carolina The football team will bus to a Thursday game at North Carolina State 
(but will fly home to allow Friday class attendance). Football and 
men’s basketball coaches will receive 5 day furloughs.
S. Florida Eliminating printed media guides, reducing team travel.
Stanford Eliminating 21 positions. Lowering the price of student basketball 
season tickets from $65 to $35.
TCU Changing equipment ordering process and scheduling more local teams 
for competition.
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Texas Adjusting air conditioning in some buildings and eliminated free soft 
drinks for staff. Reducing their use of printers and asked employees to 
choose less expensive airport parking.
Texas A&M Adjusting air conditioning in some buildings and eliminated free soft 
drinks for staff. Eliminated 17 staff, including two staff members who 
had a combined for over 70 years of service to the University.
UCF Elimination of six staff positions, elimination of professional develop-
ment travel, reduction of employee benefits, expanded travel boundar-
ies from three to four hours before permitting air travel, reduced travel 
squads in football and men’s and women’s soccer, and possible media 
guide reductions. Increased their athletic fee by $0.58 per credit hour.
UCLA AD, football coach, and basketball coach take 10% pay cuts.
UConn Leaving some positions vacant to help reduce its budget, printed fewer 
media guides and is distributing them at games rather than mailing 
them to save postage.
UNC Instituted a hiring freeze. Eliminating administrative trips to confer-
ences and conventions. Limiting the number of hotel rooms for team 
travel. Chartering smaller planes for team travel.
UNLV Reducing team equipment and apparel, eliminating two chartered 
flights for football, eliminating insurance for walk on student athletes, 
eliminating some cell phone expenses, printing fewer media guides, 
scheduling more day practices and games to save lighting and staffing 
costs. Increased student fee money.
Utah No budget or salary increases; elimination of a football fan festival.
Utah State Students passed a referendum by about 300 votes among 4500 cast 
calling for a $130 annual increase in athletic fees.
UTEP Eliminating media guides, and eliminating four positions.
Vanderbilt Basketball coach passed on a $100,000 pay raise to fund his team’s 
international travel to Australia this summer.
W. Kentucky The decision on AD’s contract extension raise will be deferred until 
January to build better working relationships with faculty.
Washington Dropping men’s and women’s swimming teams. Laying off an addi-
tional 7 people (4 were released when their swimming programs were 
dropped) and not filling two open positions. Another three positions 
will be reduced to 10 or 11 month appointments.
Wash. St. Limiting roster sizes, travel restrictions, personnel reductions. Reduce 
media guides, evaluate all travel squad sizes, require bus transportation 
for trips less than 400 miles, reduce professional as well as international 
recruiting travel, discontinue some internships and leave some vacant 
positions unfilled. Withdrawn from competing in the last of three football 
games with Hawaii by paying a $300,000 buyout to escape the contract.
Wisconsin Elimination of printed media guides. 16 furlough days per employee 
over the next two years.
Wyoming Elimination of four staff positions and the dance team as part of the 
savings.
Source: UltimateSportsInsider.com.
